Ryder Cup Lessons, Part 1

Everybody's looking for solutions approximately the Ryder Cup -- some to provide an explanation for the "Meltdown at Medinah," a few to explain the "Miracle at Medinah." The are interrelated, of route, and possibly overblown. Did the USA Team certainly have a meltdown? Seems to me that they played pretty well general. Did the Euro Team simply create a miracle? While it is able to no longer have happened on overseas soil before, any such massive comeback has been seen earlier than. How lots of the discussion is hype and how much is fact?

I'm going to take a few posts to look at this genuinely great Ryder Cup from several exclusive angles. I want to peer the bigger image -- what are we able to analyze from this one? Are there genuinely clean mistakes (or strokes of genius) that have been made? How many of the ones have been intellectual instead of physical? Is it feasible that dreams had been set and accomplished that failed to supply the effects all of us predicted? What can weekend players research that could help them play higher?

Today I'd similar to to touch upon some of the greater debated troubles surrounding this Cup.

The Non-Concession

There's been a lot made of Francesco Molinari not conceding the final match to Tiger after it became obvious that it didn't matter. It came out in the pressers that Francesco wanted to concede but was told by his Captain that it did matter, that a tie was not as good as a win, so he did what his Captain said. As a result José María has gotten some criticism for being unsportsmanlike, perhaps even using this Cup to get revenge for 1999 and the American outburst that may have affected his opportunity to match Justin Leonard's putt.

I assume something else has been disregarded right here. For all the communicate approximately the "ghost of Seve" at this Cup, the reality stays that Jos? Mar?A and Seve have been extremely near, that this became the primary Ryder Cup given that Seve's death, and that Jos? Mar?A turned into virtually pushed by way of a preference to recall Seve in these suits. No one could omit the common emotional expressions Jos? Mar?A had at numerous points within the matches, nor the silhouettes of Seve at the Euro Team's luggage.

We don't know whether Seve could have conceded the match or no longer, however I assume it's secure to mention that Jos? Mar?A failed to assume he might. At the very least, I suppose he wanted the primary Ryder Cup after Seve's passing to be an outright win. I suspect that had more to do with Jos? Mar?A's selection not to concede than anything else... And I for one am unwilling to kick the person for looking to honor his pal.

The Unplayed Pairing

This one has probably caused the most debate among the commentators: Should DL3 have played the Mickelson/Bradley pairing in the fourth team session? You may recall that I said (before the third session) he should if the pair was hot Saturday morning, a feeling shared by most people. The argument being made since then is that an 11-5 lead is insurmountable while a 10-6 lead isn't. (That's ironic, given that before 1999 most would argue that the 10-6 lead was insurmountable!)

"What if" games are risky, but. Let me point out some flaws in the wondering.

First of all, had DL3 chosen to play his hot group, there's no actuality that the teams could have long past out inside the equal order. Even if they had, we can't make sure that the results for the other groups would had been the identical due to the fact we are converting the chemistry at the route.

Some have argued that Keegan nonetheless wanted to play (I'll trust that) and that the circulate might have been to ship him out with Tiger. There are flaws with that concept:

1. There was no reason to break up Tiger and Stricks at that point. They had played badly in foursomes so DL3 sat them Saturday morning, but they had played well in the Friday fourballs. Let's not forget that they played against Colsaerts on Friday, and no pairing on the American team could have beaten his 8 birdie/1 eagle performance. The Stricker/Woods pairing posted birdies on 9 holes themselves in that Friday fourball and, given their past success as a pairing, there was absolutely no reason to believe they wouldn't do the same Saturday. DL3 would have simply considered them fourball specialists in this Cup.
2. Keegan played well because he was playing with his idol, who also indulged in Keegan's over-the-top emotional play. Tiger has always played with the quieter players and would not have encouraged the outbursts as Phil did. It's worth noting that Keegan was much less demonstrative in his singles loss, and even Nick Faldo noted that Keegan was unusual because the more you ramped him up, the better he played. That dynamic would have been gone from a Tiger/Keegan pairing.

But I think the biggest argument against Mickelson/Bradley making a difference is dreadfully obvious: Mickelson/Bradley turned into at its great in foursomes. They won their Friday fourball 2&1, the least impressive of their wins, against Rory (who played much better Saturday) and McDowell, who was almost nonexistent Friday. The match ended at 17, with McIlroy/McDowell only 3under on their last 5 holes... and that was their best stretch during the entire match. Yet Phil and Keegan actually lost ground there, going from 4up to 2up. Against the much hotter McIlroy/Poulter on Saturday, there's no guarantee that they would have won.

Has no one noticed that the ZJohnson/Dufner crew -- the one that replaced Mickelson/Bradley -- were undefeated going into the fourth session? They had been 2up going into thirteen, wherein Rory made birdie to cut their lead in 1/2. Has nobody noticed that Zach and Jason have been 3-below of their final 5 holes? Ian Poulter, as all of us understand through now, become 5-below on that identical stretch. ZJohnson/Dufner misplaced 1down, a very slim margin in opposition to a team that got warm at the remaining minute.

My point? I'm not at all sure that playing Mickelson/Bradley could have made a difference on Saturday night time. Anybody who tells you in any other case is using faulty reasoning.

The European "Advantage"

My last thought (for today, anyway) has to do with this belief that the Euros have figured something out that the US hasn't, that there's something substantially different between the two teams. Although that something is generally thought to be organizational (the Euros are more devoted to each other and we can overcome that with pods, for example), I'm hearing more and more people attribute it to... well, magic. There's no other way to describe it.

I think you can argue that the US has spent years trying to duplicate the way the Euros play... and this time, they succeeded. They created a team where the players are passionate about the Cup and each other. Most of them were in reasonable form, and the pieces were largely interchangeable. (You'll always have a few players who need a certain kind of teammate, but that's to be expected. We're individuals, not mass-produced cookies.) And in the end, they played the way the Euro team usually plays -- they dominated the team matches and got beaten in the singles. The Euros generally win the Cup when they can manage any margin of victory in the singles, while the US tends to need a huge singles victory to win.

As I informed a friend, america eventually succeeded in copying the Euro version. Unfortunately, this time they selected the 1999 Euro version!

I'll have a look at why the team matches have generally made the distinction the following day -- and why the singles have been so lopsided in 1999 and 2012 in all likelihood the day after -- however we need to do away with this superstitious mindset that appears to have evolved across the Ryder Cup. The Euros do not "want it more," america isn't always "too individualistic," the Euros don't have a "secret," and the USA is not "mentally fragile." It's not about pods or path setup or even how the teams are in reality chosen, even though such matters can in reality help. It's not even approximately stats and rankings and who appears quality on paper. And regardless of how one-sided it can sound when commentators spout their figures, the Euro crew has simplest claimed the Cup two more instances than the US inside the more than 30 years on the grounds that continental Europe joined the fray.

In the end, the Ryder Cup is about strategy. That strategy changes from Cup to Cup, and in this one it was all about the emotions of one man and how his team feels about him. It was the same way in 1999. I should point out that it's hard to plan for such things since one side can rarely anticipate it. When Ben Crenshaw made that angry, out-of-character challenge to the media in 1999, there was no way for the Euros to anticipate it. Likewise, the US hardly expected Seve's memory to have such a dramatic effect over a year after his death.

Strategy, whether we recognize it or not, always involves emotions. If the strategy rallies the troops to believe -- and manages to knock your opponents back on their heels -- then it's an effective one for this match and it probably won't work next time.

The Euro's big advantage -- at least as I see it -- is the willingness to go in without a planned strategy and then just "go with the flow." The US looks for a pod or a qualifying system or something else that they can predict, then ruthlessly execute that plan without variation.

Creativity and versatility are the keys to prevailing a Ryder Cup -- a lack of planning, if you please. The problem is not that the United States makes too many plans, it's their refusal to scrap them if new opportunities get up. The US has had a few extraordinary captains -- and I think DL3 did a first rate job -- but there is simplest one guy who can flip the US fortunes in 2014...

MacGyver.